讲座题目：Information Sharing and Information Errors in Supply Chains
In supply chain operations, manufactures often refer to the information shared from their retailers when making decisions. However, errors may occur during the information sharing process. There are two types of information errors: transmission error and source error. Transmission error occurs in the transmission of information from the retailer to the manufacturer. Source error occurs when the retailer collects inaccurate data. In this research, we study the value of information sharing in the presence of either or both types of information errors. In particular, we consider two situations in manufactures’ decision making: when the manufacturer use both the shared demand information and the retailer’s order quantity to make decisions, and when she rely solely on the shared demand information and disregard the retailer’s order quantity when doing forecasting. We analyze the values of information sharing for both settings, and characterize the lowest-cost information sharing strategy for the manufacturer. Our results suggest that transmission error and source error have significantly different impacts on the value of information sharing and the manufacturer’s optimal strategy.
香港城市大学管理科学专业博士、西安交通大学工商管理专业博士。研究方向为：数据质量与供应链管理，供应链金融，大宗商品电子交易市场。2015年至2017年在香港城市大学商学院担任研究助理。在《International Journal of Production Research》《European Journal of Operational Research》《Applied Economics》《管理科学学报》等国内外著名期刊发表多篇学术论文，出版著作《大宗商品电子交易市场理论与实践》，并公开发表多篇行业报告，多次参加国家省部级咨询、科研课题。
讲座题目：What kinds of capabilities enhance supply chain finance outcomes: A study based on dyadic necessary condition analysis
In today’s business environment, a great deal of interest and attention are directed towards supply chain finance (SCF), which can effectively improve small and medium enterprises (SMEs)’ financing outcomes. This study analyzes the dyadic necessary condition of organizational capabilities for SMEs’ financing outcomes during SCF. Using a resource-based view and extended theories, it explains the “resources-capabilities-advantages” mechanism. This study identifies three organizational capabilities in buyer-supplier relationships based on resource integration-(a) information system capability, (b) innovation capability, and (c) collaboration capability-and hypothesizes that they are different necessary conditions for focal firms and their customers to enhance financing performance. Adopting necessary condition analysis (NCA), this study explores to what extent the three kinds of capabilities are necessary for buyers and suppliers using 142 pairs of data. Through the results of necessary condition analysis, it finds that the three necessary conditions from the dyad sides are separately necessary for reaching desired levels of financing performance in buyer-supplier relationships.
中国人民大学商学院博士研究生，研究方向为战略与供应链管理、供应链金融。目前已在在《International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management》、《管理世界》、《中国工业经济》、《营销科学学报》、《管理学报》、《经济理论与经济管理》、《商业经济与管理》、《当代财经》、《财经论丛》、《中央财经大学学报》、《中国流通经济》等国内外核心期刊共发表论文20余篇，其中，被人大复印资料全文转载6篇、索引转载1篇。主持中国人民大学校级课题1项，参与国家自科基金1项，国家社科基金2项，青岛市项目1项，政府委托课题1项，发表会议论文3篇。
讲座题目：“Financing Small and Medium-Size Enterprises via E-commerce Platform”
Small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) sellers selling products via e-commerce platforms (e.g.,Amazon.com,Taobao.com) operate under revenue-sharing contracts, under which the sellers make autonomous business decisions and the platform takes a revenue cut as a referral fee for each unit sold on the platform. Business growth of many of those sellers is limited by their capital constraints and their lack of access to capital markets. E-commerce platforms have stepped in with small business loan programs offered to those sellers. We investigate the impact of the e-commerce platform's intervention on sellers' operations and financing decisions and the welfare of the sellers and the platform. In the monopoly setting, we show that it is always beneficial for the platform to lend to the seller in short of fund. Sellers with low unit cost, high revenue cut is more prone to accept a loan. In the competition setting, first, we show the existence of prisoner dilemma (PD) when the generous, altruistic financing scheme intensifies the competition. Second, with a strategic financing decision, the platform's credit rationing reduces the PD in two ways, namely elimination and intensity reduction. Third, we demonstrate that, surprisingly, both the platform and the social planner benefit from asymmetric financing scheme when the platform's cost of capital is less than a threshold.
讲座题目：Risk pooling through offline probabilistic selling
Majority of the research on probabilistic selling (PS) studies PS in the online setting, which benefits the retailer by hiding product information and postponing delivery of the probabilistic product depending on the inventory of the constituent products. In contrast, we study PS in the offline setting and explore its advantage of pooling risk through demand reshape. Modelling demand reshape under PS, we address the question of how to set the price discount for the probabilistic product to induce optimal demand reshape and make inventory decisions. We also examine the effects of demand uncertainty, customer price sensitivity, and product differentiation on the performance of PS. We demonstrate through numerical studies that PS provides inventory flexibility for the retailer, enabling it to mitigate asymmetrical supply risk. We also obtain the following findings: PS can improve the retailer’s profit at lower inventory levels with proper demand reshape induced by the optimal price discount. The optimal price discount increases with demand uncertainty. PS is more profitable with smaller product differentiation and higher customer price sensitivity. PS is a viable strategy to combat asymmetrical supply uncertainty that yield higher profit and service levels.