讲座题目：Supplier Encroachment with Retailer Partial Upstream Ownership
基于零售商部分上游持股的供应商渠道入侵策略
主 讲 人：陈静 Dalhousie University 教授
讲座时间：2026年6月22日10：00—11：30
讲座地点：学院南路校区主教学楼615
主 持 人：晏妮娜 中央财经大学商学院 教授
主讲人介绍：
Dr. Jing Chen is the William A. Black Chair in Commerce and a professor in the Department of Management Science & Information Systems at the Faculty of Management, Dalhousie University. She received her Ph.D. in Management Science from the Richard Ivey School of Business at the University of Western Ontario. Her research interests include competitive channel and supply chain management, the interface between operations management and marketing, and customer returns. She has published over 100 papers in prestigious journals, including the Production and Operations Management, Journal of Retailing, European Journal of Operational Research, Decision Sciences, The International Journal of Management Science, Naval Research Logistics, IISE Transactions, and Transportation Research Part E. Currently, she serves as an Associate Editor for The International Journal of Management Science (OMEGA), The Journal of the Operational Research Society (JORS), IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management (TEM), and International Transactions in Operational Research (ITOR). She has also published more than 30 Ivey business cases.
陈静博士现任加拿大达尔豪斯大学管理学院管理科学与信息系统系教授，同时担任威廉・A・布莱克商务讲席教授。她于西安大略大学毅伟商学院取得管理科学博士学位。其主要研究方向为：竞争渠道与供应链管理、运营管理与市场营销交叉领域、客户退货管理。她已在国际知名期刊发表论文百余篇，刊载期刊包括Production and Operations Management, Journal of Retailing, European Journal of Operational Research, Decision Sciences, The International Journal of Management Science, Naval Research Logistics, IISE Transactions, and Transportation Research Part E等。目前，她兼任《国际管理科学期刊（OMEGA）》《运筹学学会期刊（JORS）》《IEEE 工程管理汇刊（TEM）》与《国际运筹学汇刊（ITOR）》副主编。此外，她还撰写发表了 30 余篇毅伟商学院商业案例。
摘要：
This study extends that literature by examining retailer partial ownership of the supplier. When the retailer holds a noncontrolling equity stake, it shares in upstream profit without control rights. This structure both dilutes the supplier’s retained gain from direct selling and induces the retailer to order more aggressively by partially internalizing upstream profit. These effects expand total quantity, lower the market-clearing price, compress direct-channel margins, and weaken the coordination value of encroachment. As a result, partial ownership narrows the region of active direct selling, can reverse the wholesale-price effect within that region, and may render encroachment strictly unprofitable for the supplier. The retailer may still benefit from encroachment even with a negative retail margin, because equity participation allows it to capture part of upstream profit. Thus, ownership-linked governance alone can overturn the conventional view of encroachment. These insights remain robust under imperfect channel substitution and alternative decision timing.
摘要（中文）：本文针对零售商参股供应商这一议题展开研究，进一步拓展了现有相关理论成果。当零售商持有供应商的非控股股权时，可分享上游企业利润，但并不具备经营控制权。这种股权结构一方面会削减供应商直销业务的留存收益，另一方面因零售商可部分享有上游利润，会促使其加大采购订货量。上述影响会提升整体产品供给量、压低市场均衡价格、压缩直销渠道利润空间，并削弱供应商渠道入侵所带来的协同效应。由此，参股模式会缩小供应商开展直销业务的可行范围，还可能改变该范围内批发价格的作用机制，甚至让渠道入侵彻底沦为供应商的亏损选择。即便零售环节利润为负，零售商仍可从供应商的渠道入侵中获益，原因在于股权参股能使其分得部分上游利润。可见，这种股权关联的治理模式，足以颠覆学界对渠道入侵的传统认知。在渠道不完全替代、决策时序调整等不同情境下，本文所得结论依然成立。
审核：林嵩
